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The crisis of 2007-9 resulted from a financial bubble marked by weak production, 
expanding bank assets, and growing household indebtedness. For these reasons the 
crisis casts  light on the financialisation of  capitalist  economies. The  literature on 
financialisation generally links weak production with booming finance; according to 
some, causation runs from weak production to booming finance, while for others it 
runs in the opposite direction. This article argues that there is no direct causation 
between booming finance and weak production. Rather, financialisation represents 
systemic  transformation  of  capitalist  production  and  finance,  which  ultimately 
accounts for the crisis of 2007-9, and has three main features. First, less reliance of 
large corporations on banks; second, banks shifting their activities toward mediating 
in  open markets  and transacting with individuals;  third, increasing implication of 
individuals in the operations of finance.  
 


















The upheaval of 2007-9 has no historical parallel. It emanated in finance and 
spread to production partly through financial mechanisms. Its global character was 
largely  due  to  securitisation  which  encouraged  adoption  of  investment  banking 
practices among commercial banks. Above all, its proximate causes lay in mortgage 
lending to the poorest sections of the US working class.  
Not surprisingly, there has been a flood of writings on the crisis within radical 
political  economy  and  heterodox  economics.  Some  have  relied  on  traditional 
arguments  of  Marxist  political  economy,  typically  emphasising  over-accumulation 
and falling profit rates. Others have stressed the financialisation of capitalism, and 
therefore the exceptional role of finance in causing the crisis. These approaches are 
far  from  mutually  exclusive,  indeed  use  of  the  term  financialisation  has  become 
increasingly  commonplace.  But  they  reveal  an  underlying  concern  that  traditional 
explanations fare poorly in relation to this crisis.  
The  concept  of  financialisation,  in  contrast,  holds  considerable  theoretical 
promise. It is one of a few innovative ideas to come out of radical political economy 
in recent years. For one thing, it seems capable of relating the unusual features of the 
crisis to the secular growth of finance. For another, it gives insight into the structural 
transformation of capitalist economies with its attendant social implications. To be 
sure the concept is still raw and undeveloped, as is shown by considering some of the 
literature below. But there is no denying its power. 
In this light, section 2 of this paper offers an empirical account of the crisis 
that  demonstrates  its  peculiar  character,  above  all,  with  regard  to  finance  and 
particularly the role of household debt. Section 3 then discusses some of the literature 
on financialisation  and the crisis,  paying  attention to  Marxist, post-Keynesian and 
other heterodox works which propose causal links between problematic production 
(the ‘real’ economy) and thriving finance (the financial sector). Section 4 considers 
theoretical and empirical problems that arise when such links are postulated.  It is 
argued  that  causation  between  production  and  finance  is  not  direct  but  heavily 
                                                
1 This article is based on a keynote address to the annual conference of Japan Society for Political 
Economy  (Keizairiron  Gakkai),  Tokyo  University,  November  2009.  Thanks  are due to  several  JSPE 
members, who have been friends to me for many years. The article also draws heavily on the work of 
the network Research on Money and Finance. All errors and omissions are the author’s fault.   5 
mediated, while running  in both directions. On this  basis,  section 5 draws on the 
methodological approach of classical Marxism to put forth a view of financialisation 
as systemic transformation of mature capitalist economies which ultimately accounts 
for the crisis of 2007-9. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. A crisis of financialisation, 2007-9 
 
  The crisis of 2007-9 is replete with peculiar characteristics due to the role of 
the financial sector. Its outbreak reflects the ascendancy of finance in contemporary 
economies  or,  more  accurately, financialisation.  Empirical analysis of  the crisis is 
vital  to  navigating  amidst  contesting  theoretical  accounts  of  financialisation  in 
subsequent sections of this article. 
  The  crisis  broke  out  in  the  financial  sector  of  the  USA  and  other  leading 
developed  countries,  subsequently  spreading  across  the  world  economy. 
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Consequently, analysis in this section focuses on the USA, Japan, Germany, and the 
UK during 2001-7, using primarily flow of funds statistics.  There are problems of 
comparability and consistency with this data, and it should be used with caution when 
cross-country  comparisons  are  attempted.  But  it  is  adequate  for  capturing  the 
underlying processes leading to the crisis.  
  The  proximate  roots  of  the  upheaval  lie  in the expansion  of  US  mortgage 
lending after 2001: 
 
<Fig 1 here> 
 
Mortgage originations rose rapidly as interest rates were reduced after 2001, 
but peaked in 2003 as the prime market became increasingly saturated. At that time 
subprime mortgages began to rise steeply, thus supporting overall mortgage lending. 
Rapid  increase  was  possible  because  up  to  80%  of  subprime  mortgages  were 
securitised.   
                                                
2 Analysis in this section focuses entirely on the domestic economy of leading capitalist countries. 
Needless to say, both the crisis and financialisation have prominent international dimensions, above 
all, capital flows from poor to rich countries, for which see Painceira (2009) and Lapavitsas (2009a). 
These, however, do not matter the purposes of this article.    6 
A  vast  US  housing  bubble  ensued,  which  had  repercussions  on  financial 
institutions  across  the  world  as  securitised  mortgage-based  assets  were  traded 
internationally. The UK had its own housing bubble during the same period, but there 
were  no  similar  phenomena  in  Japan  and  Germany.  Consequently,  the  impact  on 
financial institutions varied considerably among the four countries, as is clear from 
the behaviour of commercial bank assets:  
 
<Fig. 2 here> 
 
  Commercial banking in Japan and Germany barely grew during the period, 
while growth appears modest in the USA because non-bank financial institutions took 
the lead in the housing bubble. But securitisation created close links between the non-
bank sector and US commercial banks, causing the ultimate downfall of the latter. A 
more revealing picture of the role of commercial banks is given by the UK, where 
assets rose enormously, reaching five times GDP. 
  Elementary  banking  theory  indicates  that  expansion  of  assets  has  to  be 
matched by appropriate rebalancing of liabilities. In this light, consider bank leverage 
measured as plain equity in proportion to assets: 
 
<Fig. 3 here> 
  
  There are significant problems of data comparability and measurement in this 
connection, but it is safe to state that leverage has been significantly lower among US 
commercial banks. This probably reflects lower holdings of government bonds (which 
carry  a  higher  capital  adequacy  coefficient)  forcing  US  banks  to  keep  higher 
proportions  of equity. German banks show no  great fluctuations in this regard, in 
contrast to Japanese banks, which reflect the long-running turmoil in Japanese finance. 
British commercial banks, once again, offer a more revealing picture, also casting 
light on the practices of US investment banks and non-bank institutions: UK bank 
leverage rose steadily.   
  The implications are evident. Return on equity can be disaggregated as RoE = 
Π / E = (Π / A) * (A / E), where Π is profit, E is equity and A is assets. The rise in 
leverage, A / E, supported high profitability for equity holders. Banking profits in the   7 
UK and the USA in the 2000s depended on banks expanding assets while lowering 
equity. There is little evidence of skill in lending.  
  But  who  accumulated  the  debt  that  matched  growing  bank  assets,  thus 
supporting bank profits in the 2000s? The traditional site for such debt would be the 
corporate sector. Consider, then, the leverage of non-bank corporations, defined as 
debt to equity: 
 
<Fig. 4 here> 
 
  It is apparent that indebtedness did not rise significantly within the productive 
sector.  There  is  considerable  variation  within  the  four  countries  but,  in  general, 
indebtedness  declined  or  remained  fairly  stable  throughout  the  period.  This  is 
consistent  with  the  evidence  on  investment  which,  as  figure  5  shows,  remained 
practically  stagnant,  or  declined  significantly  in  all  four  countries.  The  fall  in 
investment  was  most  pronounced  in  the  USA, the country  at  the epicentre  of  the 
bubble: 
 
<Fig. 5 here> 
 
  A further potential venue for debt accumulation would have been the public 
sector. However, as is shown in figure 6, there was no significant rise in public debt in 
the USA, the UK and Germany. Public debt escalated even further in Japan, but the 
causes  were  clearly  associated  with  the  country’s  internal  travails  since  the  early 
1990s.  
 
<Fig. 6 here> 
 
  Since the relevant debt accumulation occurred neither in the corporate, nor in 
the public sector, inevitably household debt rose to support bank profits:  
 
<Fig. 7 here> 
 
  The four countries present a very different picture with regard to household 
debt. While indebtedness among German and Japanese households fell, that among   8 
US and UK households rose steeply. The bulk of this debt - up to 80% - was due to 
mortgages.  Bank  profitability  was  supported  by  mortgaged  household  incomes  as 
workers and other social layers were caught in a housing bubble. Indeed, the weight 
of  unsecured  consumer  debt  fell  in  the  late  2000s,  especially  in  the  UK.  This  is 
consistent with the performance of consumption during the bubble. Contrary to what 
has often been asserted in public debate, consumption relative to GDP remained at 
best stable, or even fell in Germany and the UK. At the root of this phenomenon lay 
stagnant real wages.  
 
<Fig 8 here> 
 
  To recap, a pure financial bubble occurred in 2001-7, fed by mortgage credit 
and sustained by securitisation. Banks and other financial institutions grew rapidly in 
the USA and the UK, sustaining profitability through higher leverage. During this 
period the real sector performed indifferently, and investment even fell in the USA. 
This is a notable difference with the Japanese real estate and stock market bubble of 
the 1980s, during which private investment rose significantly. 
Furthermore, corporate and public indebtedness did not escalate. Rather, the 
debt that supported bank profits was accumulated by the household sector, primarily 
in the USA and the UK. Much of this debt was acquired by the least creditworthy 
layers of the working class as subprime lending surged. When repayment difficulties 
materialised among the poorest workers, the bubble came to an end, and banks went 
prostrate. The world recession that followed in 2008-9 was in large measure induced 
by shrinkage of credit and collapsing demand.  
It is historically unprecedented for a global crisis to be precipitated by debt 
default among the poorest workers. The global dimension of the crisis, moreover, is 
largely due to securitisation that spread problematic mortgage debt across the world. 
This  is  a  further  vital  difference  with  the  Japanese  bubble  of  the  1980s,  which 
remained a local occurrence. In these respects, the crisis reflects the transformation of 
mature capitalist economies in recent decades, and more specifically the advance of 
financialisation.  Consider,  therefore,  some  of  the  responses  of  radical  political 
economy to the issues posed by financialisation in general, and the crisis in particular.   
 
   9 
3. Radical approaches to financialisation and the crisis of 2007-9  
 
3.1 Marxist political economy of financial expansion 
 
The Marxist current of Monthly Review, guided by Sweezy and Magdoff, put 
forth  original  insights  on  financialisation  already  in  the  1970s. 
3  Capitalist 
accumulation in the twentieth century is characterised by three trends: first, slowing 
down  of  the  rate  of  growth,  second;  second,  rise  of  monopolistic  multinational 
corporations; third, financialisation (Sweezy 1997). These trends are associated with 
the  fundamental  problem  of  the  ‘absorption  of  the  surplus’  that  presumably 
characterises mature capitalism (Baran and Sweezy 1966).  
Specifically, monopolies generate an ever expanding surplus, which cannot be 
absorbed by the sphere of production, resulting in stagnation. To relieve stagnation, 
unproductive  consumption  (including  pure  waste)  inexorably  rises  in  mature 
capitalism. It is apparent that this argument is quite different from the analysis of 
accumulation and falling profit rates within classical Marxism. What matters here, 
however, is the use to which it was put when economic turmoil took hold in the 1970s. 
Briefly put, as production stagnated under the weight of the surplus, capital began to 
seek  refuge  in  circulation,  and  above  all  in  the  speculative  activities  of  finance. 
Financialisation  emerged  as  the  sphere  of  production  became  inundated  by  the 
investible surplus.  
It is a measure of Sweezy’s brilliance as political economist that he surmised 
the future weight of finance already in the 1970s, particularly in view of the relative 
neglect of finance in his work. But then Sweezy was one of the first Anglo-Saxon 
Marxist economists to have become familiar with Hilferding’s writings. Indeed, he 
was fully aware of the classical continental tradition on the role of finance in capitalist 
accumulation. The apprenticeship he had served under Schumpeter stood him in good 
stead in this regard.   
The argument  that  finance  has  expanded  because  the  sphere  of  production 
faces  endogenous  difficulties  has  proven  very  influential,  even  when  the  rest  of 
                                                
3 See Magdoff and Sweezy (1987). Bellamy Foster (2007, 2008) offers a clear account of the use and 
meaning of the term for Monthly Review. The recently published book by Foster and Magdoff (2009) 
places the crisis of 2007-9 in the context of the current’s approach. Note that Pollin (2004) has lauded 
Sweezy’s early awareness of financialisation, acknowledging his own debt to it.    10 
Monthly Review analysis has not been accepted. Political economy explanations of 
the  crisis  of  2007-9  typically  stress  the  contrast  between  troubled  production  and 
thriving  finance.  The  underlying  view  is  that  capital  has  confronted  problematic 
profitability  by  seeking  financial  profits.  But  at  some  point  the  potency  of  the 
financial escape declined, and crisis manifests itself.  
The  most  sophisticated  and  influential  variant  of  this  argument  has  been 
offered by Brenner (2002, 2006, 2009), who has linked stagnation in the sphere of 
production to Marx’s theory of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. Since the late 
1960s  sustained  overcapacity  in  production  has  exacerbated  competition,  thus 
lowering profit rates. Incumbent enterprises have protected their positions, preventing 
a resurgence of profit rates, and leading to permanent, if latent, crisis in the sphere of 
production. Actual crisis has been evaded by palliatives, such as boosting demand 
through  exchange  rate  manipulation  and  encouraging  cheap  credit.  When  credit 
creation spurred by the Federal Reserve in 2001 had run its course, the underlying 
reality of problematic production manifested itself and the world was plunged into 
crisis. 
Brenner’s  account of  the  tendency  of  the  rate of  profit to fall  has  little  in 
common with Marx’s. 
4 However, this has not mattered in this connection. Far more 
important has been that Brenner treats the upheaval fundamentally as a crisis of over-
accumulation and falling profit rates. Writings by Harman (2009 and, much more 
succinctly, 2010) and Callinicos (2010) have shared this point, without necessarily 
accepting Brenner’s core theoretical analysis. For both, financial expansion and credit 
provision were able to create periods of prosperity, but as soon as credit growth had 
run its course, the underlying crisis burst out.  
Harman and Callinicos are keen to defend the explanatory power of Marx’s 
tendency of the rate of profit to fall (or their interpretation of it) over the crisis of 
2007-9. They share the strong underlying perception that unless the ‘true’ roots of the 
crisis were shown to lie in production, the crisis would appear to be non-systemic, 
possibly the result of policy errors, or speculative excesses. Unlike Brenner, however, 
both openly accept that financialisation is a notable trend of contemporary capitalism. 
                                                
4 As was made clear by several contributors to two special issues of Historical Materialism (vol. 4, no 
1, 1999, and vol. 5, no. 1, 1999) dedicated to Brenner’s original argument.   11 
They do not offer a systematic definition of it, but superimpose financial expansion on 
the presumably fundamental process of over-accumulation. 
5  
In these respects both books are characteristic of the strand of writing that 
seeks to reassert the explanatory power of over-accumulation theory over the crisis. It 
is also notable that such writing is often laced with references to Marx’s (1981: 567) 
concept of fictitious capital. At core this is a technical idea amounting to net present 
value accounting, i.e. ideal sums of money that result through discounting streams of 
future payments attached to financial assets. These ideal sums correspond to financial 
prices, which can fluctuate independently of what has happened to the money capital 
originally  expended  to purchase  a  financial  asset.  In  that  obvious  sense,  financial 
prices, particularly those on the stock-market, represent fictitious capital. 
 6  
Fictitious capital can offer insight into the operations of finance, as is shown 
briefly below with reference to Hilferding. But fictitious capital can also be a widow’s 
cruse of extraordinary arguments regarding the financial sector. The huge nominal 
values  associated  with  some  financial  markets,  for  instance,  could  give  the  false 
impression that the state lacks the resources for effective intervention. Alternatively, 
and as is exemplified by Harman (2010), it is possible to think that bloated nominal 
values mean that the financial sector made ‘fictional’ profits during the bubble. The 
implication  would  be  that  general  recorded  profitability  was  exaggerated,  and  the 
‘true’ profit rate was probably lower. The result of this argument is to divert attention 
from  precisely the point that  needs explaining, namely  the existence  of enormous 
financial profits while general profitability has been weak.  
Confusion also occurs between fictitious capital and another of Marx’s (1981: 
Pt V) key ideas, namely interest-bearing or loanable money capital. This is a special 
type of capital that is available for lending and is remunerated through the payment of 
interest. Trading  loanable capital could certainly  give  rise to fictitious capital, but 
loanable capital itself is anything but fictitious. Rather, it emerges from investment 
and consumption processes attached to capitalist accumulation, and initially takes the 
form  of  idle  money.  Loanable  capital  is  a  hard  reality  of  the  capitalist  economy, 
                                                
5 A side-effect of this approach is to create the impression that the crisis had been foreseen. In truth, 
those on the Left who appreciated the importance of financial events in the summer of 2007 were 
few and far between, at least in the UK. 
6 Marx actually used the term to denote several distinct cases of financial price or traded value. But 
no generality is lost by considering fictitious capital as simply net present value.   12 
affording to its holders direct claims to the national product. Financialisation reflects 
systemic  changes  in  the  mobilisation  and  use  of  loanable  capital,  as  is  shown  in 
section 5.  
 
 
3.2 Post-Keynesian analysis of financialisation 
 
The analytical connection between troubled production and booming finance 
is  also  present  in  post-Keynesian  analysis  of  financialisation.  Epstein  (2005),  for 
instance, has stressed the increasing weight of financial activities in the economy as 
capital  favours  investment  in  finance  rather  than  production.  Unlike  the  Marxist 
approaches reviewed above, however, post-Keynesians stress the deleterious role of 
booming finance on production. The poor performance of the real sector has been 
caused in large measure by the expansion of the financial sector.  
Post-Keynesian analysis of financialisation does not derive from Minsky, in 
whose work there is little on the long-term balance between finance and the rest of the 
economy, except brief references to ‘money manager capitalism’ in some very late 
output (Minsky 1996; Minsky and Whalen 1996). Rather, it is based on the concept of 
the  rentier, and  in  particular  the  money  lender  as  rentier.  This  is  clear  in  several 
influential works, such as Crotty (1990), Pollin (2007), and Epstein (2005). The re-
emergence of the rentier – partly due to neoliberal economic policy – has fostered 
financial at the expense of industrial profits. Thus, financialisation has induced poor 
performance  in  investment,  output  and  growth  in  developed  countries.  Policy 
intervention is required to regulate finance – for instance, liquidity reserves of banks, 
direction of credit, limits on investment banking activities, and so on – resulting in 
improved output, employment, and income (Crotty 2008, 2009; Crotty and Epstein 
2008, 2009). 
The rentier, as is well known, is important to Keynes’ (1973: ch. 24) analysis 
of mature capitalism. A parasitical economic entity, the rentier extracts profits due to 
the  scarcity  of  capital,  and  might  thus  depress  investment  and  profitability.  For 
Keynes, successful capitalism requires the ‘euthanasia of the rentier’ effected through 
low interest rates. The rentier makes only fleeting appearances in Marx’s writings, 
and there are no clear references to entire social strata of rentiers. But some of Marx’s 
(1981: ch. 21, 22, 23, 24) analysis of ‘monied’ capitalists is certainly reminiscent of   13 
the rentier. ‘Monied’ capitalists are a section of the capitalist class that does not invest 
its capital in production but prefers to lend it to others. Thus, money capital available 
for loans is owned by the ‘monied’ section, but is put to use by the productive section, 
the latter paying a part of the resulting surplus value as interest to the former. Tension 
and opposition between the two are inevitable.  
However, in Marx’s Capital there is a further and quite different approach to 
finance. 
7 Namely, capital for loan is seen as emerging spontaneously through  the 
operations of industrial (and other) capital, by taking the form of idle money in the 
first  instance.  It  does  not  belong  to  ‘monied’  capitalists,  and  nor  does  receipt  of 
interest  define  a  distinct  section  within  the  capitalist  class.  Rather,  the  financial 
system is set of markets and institutions (operating as separate capitalist concerns) 
that mobilise loanable capital and support capitalist accumulation. This approach is 
naturally  averse  to  treating  financialisation  as  the  triumph  of  the  rentier  over  the 
productive capitalist. It also offers far richer insight into contemporary capitalism, as 
is shown below.  
Be that as it may, post-Keynesian stress on the rentier shares common ground 
with some strains of Marxist theory. This is clear in the work of Crotty, but also more 
recent publications, for instance, Stockhammer (1994) and Orhangazi (2009). Much 
of this output has a strong empirical dimension, seeking to show that the rentier has a 
depressing effect on the real sector, typically trough constraining available investment 
funds and/or lowering the returns of industrial capitalists. Broad affinities between 
post-Keynesian and Marxist theory along similar lines are also apparent in the output 




3.3 Other heterodox approaches to financialisation 
 
Two other approaches to financialisation, both associated with Marxist theory, 
merit further mention. The first relates to Arrighi (1994), who places financialisation 
within an ambitious cyclical theory of the world economy since the early modern era. 
Hegemonic  capitalist  formations  follow  a  cyclical  pattern  of  evolution,  while 
                                                
7 For further discussion see Lapavitsas (1997).   14 
succeeding each other. Financialisation represents autumn, that is, hegemonic power 
ebbs away as the hegemon’s productive powers weaken and the sphere of finance 
expands. Genoa, the Netherlands, Britain and the USA entered financialisation when 
they  lost  their  prowess  in  production  and  trade.  In  decline,  they  became  lenders, 
particularly to younger powers that emerged to overtake them.  
From this perspective, the current crisis is another episode in the long-term 
decline of US hegemony. A key problem with Arrighi’s theory applied to the current 
era,  however,  is  the  absence  of  an  obvious  hegemonic  replacement  for  the  USA. 
Arrighi’s own suggestion of Japan in the Epilogue of his book was rather unfortunate, 
and nor is China a better bet. For, the USA has been a massive net borrower for many 
years, not least from Japan and China. If this is the autumn of US hegemony, it has 
not coincided with the US emerging as lender to the world, certainly not to China.  
Nonetheless,  Arrighi’s  work  was  path-breaking  in  so  far  as  it  has  placed 
financialisation within a broad historical perspective. Furthermore, it partly motivated 
Krippner’s  (2005)  innovative  empirical  study  of  US  financialisation.  Krippner 
established the rising importance of financial profits for non-financial corporations 
during the last five decades. Drawing attention to financial profits is a point of vital 
importance in analysing financialisation, as is also discussed below. 
The second approach was put forth by Regulation School in the 1990s. 
8 The 
Regulation approach to financialisation resulted partly from the long-standing interest 
of this School in money and finance. The presumed disintegration of Fordism has led 
Regulation theorists to search for a new regime of regulation, including in the sphere 
of finance. For Boyer (2000), the new regime of regulation has begun to be formed 
around financial markets, above all, the stock exchange. However, regulation through 
finance can have problematic effects for the performance of accumulation, including 
rates of growth, output and so on (Aglietta 2000; Aglietta and Breton 2001). 
9 
The  regulationist  approach  has  affinities  with  the  voluminous  literature  on 
changes  in  corporate  governance  since  the  1970s.  ‘Shareholder  value’  and  the 
associated  short-termism  of  corporate  enterprises  have  attracted  the  interest  of 
                                                
8 Anglo-Saxon audiences were introduced to it largely through the journal Economy & Society 
particularly, but not exclusively, a seminal special issue on financialisation in 2001 (number 30). 
9 For an early and balanced discussion of Regulationist analysis of financialisation see Grahl and 
Teague (2000).   15 
political  economists  and  business  school  writers.  The  widely  quoted  article  by 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) demonstrated the connections between shareholder 
value and company downsizing as neoliberalism rose to ascendancy.  
This  theoretical terrain begins to overlap with the economic sociology and 
geography of financialisation. Economic geographers have traced the social impact of 
financialisation, including its implications for the spatial development of capitalism 
(Leyshon  and  Thrift  2007).  Considerable  work  has  been  produced  on  the 
financialisation of individual life (Langley 2008) as well as on the cultural aspects of 
finance in contemporary capitalism (Pryke and Du Gay 2007).   
Reviewing this literature is beyond the confines of this paper. It should be 
noted,  however,  that  it  is  (often  consciously)  eclectic  in  its  theoretical  approach. 
Emphasis is placed on revealing key features of contemporary capitalism, almost as 
‘thick  description’,  rather  than  advancing  theoretical  explanations.  This  is  clearly 
demonstrated by the substantial and illuminating output on financialisation generated 
by the UK Centre for Research on Socio-Cultural Change in recent years. From early 
analyses of financialisation, researchers at CRESC have proceeded to discuss ‘coupon 
pool’  capitalism,  the  transformation  of  banking,  and  the  emergence  of  new  elites 
(Savage and Williams 2008).  
 
 
4. The theoretical problem of associating weakness in production with thriving 
finance    
 
Associating  the  rise  of  finance  with  persistent  malaise  of  production  is  a 
source of strength for heterodox approaches to financialisation. However, difficulties 
emerge when causation is sought between weak production and thriving finance - 
whether in one direction, or the other - as tends to happen with the theories reviewed 
in the previous section. 
Linking  the  performance  of  capitalist  accumulation  to  the  structure  and 
performance of the financial system has a long pedigree in economic theory. The 
issue has been especially prominent in development economics where, in its current 
form,  it  originates  with  Gerschenkron  (1962).  Typically  the  debate  pivots  on  the 
distinction  between  bank-based  (or  German-Japanese)  versus  market-based  (or 
Anglo-American) financial systems, and their respective effectiveness in promoting   16 
capitalist development. 
10 It is indisputable that financialisation has been accompanied 
by gradual ascendancy and spread of market-based financial institutions and practices 
across the developing world.  
Though  this  literature  does  not  have  a  direct  bearing  on  the  issue  of 
financialisation, it is notable that causation is generally taken to run from finance to 
real  accumulation.  Namely,  it  is  assumed  that,  if  the  financial  system  had  an 
appropriate design, beneficial effects would follow for economic growth. This is the 
basis on which the World Bank and other multilateral organisations have supported 
the introduction of market-based practices across the world (King and Levine 1993, 
Levine 1997). 
11 
For classical Marxist political economy, on the other hand, the relationship 
between finance and real accumulation is substantially more complex. For Marx, as 
was briefly mentioned above, the financial system in industrial capitalism comprises 
institutions and markets that support accumulation (Itoh and Lapavitsas 1999: ch. 4). 
In turn, industrial capital supports the emergence of financial capitals and structures 
that  serve  its  purposes.  The  structure,  composition,  practices  and  operations  of 
capitalist finance are ultimately determined by the requirements of accumulation. By 
the same token, the profits of financial capital arise out of surplus value generated in 
production. At the same time, the financial system extends and sustains accumulation 
in  a  variety  of  ways,  such  as  mobilising  idle  money  capital,  creating  liquidity, 
equalising profit rates, and so on.  
In broad historical terms, for Marx,  financial capital is an  ancient form of 
economic activity, while financial processes are important to primitive accumulation. 
Capitalist development implies that industrial capital subordinates financial capital to 
its purposes, turning it into a subsidiary sector of the capitalist economy. Nonetheless, 
the financial system retains some of the ancient, pre-industrial character of financial 
capital.  It  can  thus  take  a  destructive,  predatory  stance  toward  real  accumulation, 
continuing to extract returns even when surplus value creation is in difficulties. This is 
an important point for the analysis of financialisation. 
                                                
10 The literature is very extensive and it has always had a strong political economy component. For an 
influential mainstream treatment see Allen and Gale (2000). 
11 At a further remove, support for market-based finance has drawn on endogenous growth theory, 
but that is completely beyond the scope of this article.    17 
Causation between real accumulation and finance, in other words, runs in both 
directions, even if the former sets the parameters for the latter. Even more important, 
however, is that such causation is never direct but always mediated, and heavily so. A 
complex set of structures, often reflecting historical, institutional, political, customary 
and  even  cultural  factors,  mediate  the  interaction  between  finance  and  real 
accumulation. Thus, real accumulation shapes the financial system through the trade 
credit customs and practices of industrial corporations, the replacement of trade by 
banking credit, the availability of reserves and liquidity for banks, the informational 
environment of inter-bank lending and so on. Finance, on the other hand, impacts on 
real accumulation through credit accelerating the turnover of capital, lower money 
reserves  improving  enterprise  profitability,  loans and  information  opening  up  new 
areas of profitability, and so on (Lapavitsas 2003: ch 4). 
It is misleading to seek direct causation along the lines of ‘troubled production 
has led to growth in finance’, or ‘booming finance has led to weak production’. The 
real issue is to specify the mediations through which malaise in production has been 
associated  with  booming  finance  in  recent  decades.  This  involves  establishing 
changes in the behaviour of industrial capital, the operations of banks, the practices of 
workers, the articulation of financial markets, the interventions of the state, and so on. 
These are also necessary steps in demonstrating the character of financialisation. The 
issue, in other words, is to show how industry, banks, workers, financial markets, and 
so on, have become ‘financialised’, individually as well as jointly. Causation between 
indifferently  performing  real accumulation and a  booming financial  system  would 
then appear in its several dimensions.    
It is not surprising, consequently, that problems arise for theories that seek 
direct causation between problematic accumulation and booming finance, particularly 
in view of a crisis as unusual as that of 2007-9. A distinct social layer of rentiers, for 
instance, is far from evident in contemporary capitalism. It is erroneous to conflate the 
financial system with a rentier section of the capitalist class, i.e. owners of money 
capital available for lending. Financial institutions are intermediaries that mobilise 
idle money across social classes, not a rentier social layer. The growth of bank assets 
and the rise in bank leverage supporting profitability during 2001-7 are not evidence 
of rentier activity. Furthermore, the presumed social tension between (‘bad’) rentier 
and (‘good’) industrialist has been far from visible in the course of the recent crisis.   18 
Ineed, there has been remarkable commonality of response to the crisis by corporate 
and financial interests.  
On the other hand, theories which assume that stagnating real accumulation 
had  led  to  booming  finance,  or  financialisation,  find  it  hard  to  accommodate  the 
inherent drive of capitalist production to restructure itself. This is far from theoretical 
nit-picking.  Production  has  been  transformed  since  the  1970s  drawing  on  new 
technologies in information and telecommunications, as well as on deregulated labour. 
There has been economic growth, even if lower on average than in the 1950s and 
1960s, and capitalist production has made enormous strides in poorer countries.  
Even more severe problems emerge when the frequent crises of recent years, 
including 2007-9, are explained as outcomes of over-accumulation in production. For 
one thing, there is no evidence that over-accumulation took place in the USA, Japan 
or across Europe in the 2000s, as was shown in section 2. Similarly, no significant 
decline  in  profit  rates  occurred  on  the  approach  to  crisis.  Profitability  among 
manufacturing  and  other  firms  appears  to  have  held  even  in  the  depths  of  the 
recession of 2009. To be sure average profitability in developed countries has been 
consistently below the levels of the 1960s, despite recovering from the trough of the 
early  1980s. 
12 But  the  crisis  of  2007-9  has  little  in  common  with  a  crisis  of 
profitability, such as 1973-5, as is apparent from the extraordinary role of credit and 
the indebtedness of poor workers. 
Things  are  not  much  better  if  it  is  claimed  that  the  crisis  resulted  from 
underlying  over-accumulation,  but  it  was  postponed  or  delayed  through  financial 
expansion.  Such  an  approach  might  be  called  the  ‘crisis-in-suspension’  view  of 
contemporary capitalism. Yet, it is very strange political economy that treats over-
accumulation crises as the normal state of the capitalist economy, except that they 
keep  being  postponed  through  various  expedients.  This  is,  indeed,  a  reversal  of 
classical  Marxism,  for  which  restructuring  is  an  inevitable  response  to  over-
accumulation, while crises are temporary and sharp upheavals that prepare the ground 
for the restoration of profitability.  
At a further remove, theories that seek to explain the rise of finance as the 
result of over-accumulation typically overlook the separate, ‘in itself’, character of 
                                                
12 See Dumenil and Levy (2004, 2005). Dumenil has stated categorically at two RMF conferences (May 
2008 and November 2009) that the crisis of 2007-9 is not due to falling profitability.   19 
financial actions by industry, banks, individual workers, and others. Instead, recourse 
is sought to the putative drive of industrial capitalists to get rid of low profitability, 
which presumably leads to engagement in finance. The rise of finance appears as an 
escape, a last resort for capitalists drowning under the weight of funds that cannot be 
profitably invested in production. But financialisation is nothing of the sort. The crisis 
of 2007-9, as was shown in section 2, was caused by the confluence of unprecedented 
financial actions by banks, households, and industry. It is mere assertion to claim that 
these resulted from low profitability, or over-accumulation in production.     
To recap, there is no doubt that the rise of finance in recent decades has been 
accompanied by indifferent performance of real accumulation. 
13 But it is misleading 
– both empirically and theoretically – to seek direct causation between the two. Rather, 
causation is mediated by the independent financial actions of the separate entities of 
the capitalist economy. Analysis of financialisation requires detailed examination of 
the behaviour of industry, banks and workers, while focusing on the structures of the 
financial  system  in  their  own  right.  A  relevant  approach  is  summarised  in  the 
following section.  
Marxist political economy, broadly understood, offers significant guidance in 
this regard. There is, for instance, path-breaking work on derivative markets by Bryan 
and Rafferty (2007), even though they interpret derivatives as a new type of money. 
There is also recent writing on the international political economy of the current crisis, 
undertaken from various standpoints, for instance, Gowan (2009), Panitch and Gindin 
(2009) and Wade (2008). It stresses the political dimension of financial phenomena, 
while remaining mostly at the international level, but nonetheless sheds light on the 
fundamental processes of contemporary finance.  
Finally, there is Marxist work that is acutely aware of financialisation, while 
examining its specific financial dimensions. Blackburn (2006) has put forth several 
insights  regarding  the  operations  of  financial  markets  and  associated  financial 
institutions. Above all, Chesnais (1997) has long studied financialisation, although 
little of his work has been translated in English. Chesnais has stressed the role of the 
rentier, but is also fully aware of the international aspect of financial flows.   
 
 
                                                
13 Shown by Glyn (2006) succinctly and concisely.     20 
5. Financialisation as systemic transformation 
 
The approach to financialisation summarised in this section was developed 
after  the  emergence  of  crisis  in  2007. 
14 It  draws  on  classical  Marxist  debates  on 
imperialism  and  finance  capital,  particularly  the  methodological  approach  of 
Hilferding  (1981)  and  Lenin  (1964).  In  this  light,  financialisation  represents  a 
systemic transformation of the capitalist economy.   
Summarising  ruthlessly,  Hilferding  argued  that  capitalism  was  transformed 
through the rise of finance capital at the end of the nineteenth century. Finance capital 
was created as monopolistic corporations increasingly relied on banks for investment 
finance. Industrial and banking capitals were amalgamated, with banks in dominant 
position. The rise of finance capital led to erection of trade barriers, export of capital, 
militarism,  and  imperialism.  Lenin  took  the  core  of  Hilferding’s  analysis,  added 
‘parasitical  rentiers’  as  well  greater  emphasis  on  monopoly,  and  produced  the 
definitive Marxist theory of imperialism. 
Note also that Hilferding identified a new form of profits for the capitalist 
class as finance capital took hold. Future profits are discounted at the rate of interest 
in stock markets, but capital actually invested generates the rate of profit. Since the 
rate of interest tends to be below the rate of profit, the price paid for shares exceeds 
the capital actually invested. The difference is ‘founder’s profit’, and accrues in a 
lump sum to those who issue share. Banks also  obtain parts  of it as  payment for 
investment banking.  
Financialisation  has  evident  analogies  with  Hilferding’s  and  Lenin’s  time: 
multinational corporations dominate the world economy; finance is on the ascendant; 
capital export has grown substantially; a certain type of imperialism has reasserted 
itself.  But  it  is  also  apparent  that  the  original  theory  does  not  fully  fit  present 
conditions: there is no fusion of banks with industrial capital; banks are not dominant 
over industry; there are no trade barriers corresponding to territorial empires. 
Nonetheless, the methodological approach of Hilferding and Lenin remains 
sound.  Namely,  both  sought  deeper  causes  for  the  phenomena  of  their  time  in 
fundamental relations of accumulation, including credit relations among monopolistic 
                                                
14 See, above all, the special issue of Historical Materialism on financialisation, particularly Lapavitsas 
(2009), and Dos Santos (2009).    21 
enterprises  and  banks.  The  rise  of  finance capital  had  organisational  implications, 
such  as  dense  connections  between  finance  and  industry  through  interlocking 
appointments, exchange of information, and joint decision making. Trade barriers, 
capital export, and imperialism flowed naturally from these developments. That is, 
imperialism was not an arbitrary political strategy but a phenomenon with specific 
historical content rooted in economic processes.  
In this light, the point of departure for a systemic approach to financialisation 
is given by molecular relations between contemporary industrial and financial capitals. 
Since the late 1960s the world economy has come to be dominated by large monopoly 
capitals  (multinational  corporations)  in  terms  of  both  trade  and  foreign  direct 
investment. 
15 However, contrary to Hilferding, large corporations have been able to 
finance investment without relying heavily on banks. The primary mechanism has 
been retention of own profits, as was observed by Sweezy (1942: 267) decades ago. 
External  finance  for  large  corporations,  meanwhile,  has  been  raised 
increasingly in open financial markets due to flexibility and low cost. Even the wage 
bill is frequently financed through the issuing of commercial paper. Consequently, 
corporations have developed skills in independent financial trading, including trade 
credit but also securities and foreign exchange trading. Successive waves of take-
overs, furthermore, have led to corporations becoming heavily involved in bond and 
equity  trading  in  stock  markets. 
16  In  short,  monopoly  capitals  have  become 
‘financialised’, i.e., they are at once more independent from banks and more heavily 
involved in financial activities on their own account. This fits the evidence shown in 
section 2: the enormous expansion of bank assets in the 2000s had little to do with 
lending to corporations for investment.  
Consequently, banks have restructured themselves in several ways since the 
1970s,  two  of  which  stand  out.  First,  banks  have  turned  toward  households  and 
individuals  as  sources  of  profit;  second,  banks  have  turned  to  financial  market 
mediation to earn fees, commissions, and profits from trading, i.e. toward investment 
banking.  
The  turn  of  banks  toward  households  is  related  to  the  financialisation  of 
workers’ revenue, a striking aspect of the last three decades. It includes increased 
                                                
15 See Morera and Rojas (2009). 
16 See Dos Santos (2009) for evidence for the USA.   22 
borrowing (mortgages, general consumption, education, health, and so on) but also 
expanding financial assets (housing, pensions, insurance, money market funds, and so 
on).  Financialisation  of workers’  revenue is  associated  with  real  wages  remaining 
stagnant,  or  rising  very  slowly,  since  the  late  1970s.  It  is  also  related  to  public 
provision retreating across a range of services: housing, pensions, education, health, 
transport, and so on.  
In that context, workers’ consumption has become increasingly privatised and 
mediated by the financial system. Banks and other financial institutions have been 
able to extraction profit directly out of wages and salaries, rather than surplus value. 
They have also been able to make profits out of workers’ assets, particularly as public 
provision of pensions has retreated, encouraging the channelling of workers’ savings 
to pension funds, insurance companies, money funds, and thus to the stock market.  
The ‘financialisation’ of workers’ income, savings, consumption and assets 
characterises the current period. It also stamped the crisis of 2007-9, as was shown in 
section 2. But relations between banks and households are qualitatively different from 
relations between banks and industrial capitalists. The former involve finance that is 
not directly involved in generating surplus value in accumulation. Furthermore, the 
aim  of  workers,  generally  speaking,  is  to  acquire  use  values,  while  financial 
institutions and industrial capitalists share a similar aim, i.e., profit extraction. By the 
same token, there are systematic differences in information as well as economic and 
social power between banks and workers.  
The emergence of financial profits out of wages and salaries as a systematic 
social  phenomenon  has  been  called  financial  expropriation  (Lapavitsas  2009). 
17 
Given the specific features of relations between workers and financial institutions, it 
is  not  surprising  that  predatory  and  usurious  practices  have  proliferated,  both  in 
lending and in handling workers’ assets. 
18 In these respects financialisation represents 
the  revival  of  the  ancient  predatory  stance  of  the  financial  system  toward  both 
economy and society. 
The turn of banks toward investment banking, on the other hand, has been 
fostered  by  the  growth  of  open  financial  markets.  Investment  banking  typically 
borrows  in  wholesale  money  markets  to  invest  in  securities,  thus  earning  profits 
                                                
17 See also Dos Santos (2009) for further analysis. 
18 See Dymski (2009) for analysis of US predatory lending, especially the racial dimension.    23 
through  fees,  commissions  and  proprietary  trading.  The  rise  of  these  banking 
activities was given formal status with the abolition of the Glass-Steagall Act in the 
USA in 1999, and similar legislation elsewhere. Investment banking has been fuelled 
by successive waves of mergers and acquisitions among monopoly capitals during the 
last three decades. It has also benefited from the channelling of personal savings to 
stock markets at the behest of the state. Finally, it has found room for growth in the 
new markets that have emerged in derivatives, particularly as exchange rate instability 
set in.  
The  crisis  of  2007-9  represents  a  particularly  acute  combination  of  bank 
lending to individuals with investment banking, as was summed up in section 2. Large 
commercial banks borrowed in the money markets, used the funds to finance lending 
to workers for mortgages, and made profits out of trading mortgage-based securities. 
In  effect  banks  ‘churned’  their  capital  to  create  off-balance  sheet  items,  drawing 
profits  from  fees  or  capital  gains.  By  implication  banks  came  to  rely  on  money 
markets  to  obtain  liquidity,  while  weakening  their  solvency.  These  two  effect 
combined to produce the most acute phenomena of the crisis. 
19 
The  transformation  of  commercial  banks  was  inevitably  accompanied  by 
profound  changes  in  information-gathering  and  risk  management.  Dealing  with 
individuals normally has prohibitive informational costs due to large numbers and 
small  size  of  transactions.  But  the  technological  revolution  in  information  and 
telecommunications in recent decades has allowed banks to adopt ‘credit scoring’ and 
associated statistical manipulation of risk. 
20 Similarly, banks have adopted essentially 
investment banking techniques to manage the risk attached to their balance sheets in 
general. The dominant practices of Value at Risk rely on computationally-intensive 
statistically-based techniques, which rest on mark-to-market accounting.  
In short, ‘relational’ have been replaced by ‘hard’ methods of ascertaining 
creditworthiness.  Banks  relied  less  on  personal  visits,  the  placement  of  bank 
employees within corporation structures, and the management of corporate accounts 
and monetary transactions, and more on computationally intensive statistical methods. 
Furthermore, due diligence on marketed loans was often been subcontracted to other 
institutions, such as credit rating agencies. The net result appears to have been a net 
                                                
19 See Lapavitsas (2009). 
20 See Lapavitsas and Dos Santos (2008).   24 
loss of ability of banks to judge creditworthiness. This, again, was a notable feature of 
the  crisis  of  2007-9,  marked  by  explosive  growth  of  self-evidently  problematic 





The upheaval of 2007-9 emerged at the end of a bubble sustained by housing 
credit and financial innovation. It was shown in this article that a striking feature of 
the  bubble  was  rapid  growth  of  financial  institutions  on  the  back  of  investment 
banking activities. Such growth was matched by household indebtedness in the USA 
and the UK. Meanwhile, the bubble had a modest impact on production and even 
consumption in mature countries.  
The  crisis  was  thus  systemic  and  reflected  the  rise  of  finance  relative  to 
production  in  recent  years,  a  trend  that  political  economists  have  increasingly 
captured  through  the  term  financialisation.  The  origins  of  this  concept  lie  within 
Marxist  political  economy,  but  it  has  been  deployed  in  different  ways  by  post-
Keynesians and other social scientists.  
The  literature  on  financialisation  focuses  on  the  concurrently  occurring 
phenomena  of  expanding  finance  and  indifferently  performing  production,  while 
typically seeking causation from one to the other. It was argued in the article that 
there is no direct causation between finance and production, in either direction. Rather, 
complex mediating processes exist between the two, which have to be analysed in 
their own right, if the concept of financialisation is to have explanatory power.  
In this light, it was shown that financialisation is a systemic transformation of 
capitalist  economies  with  three  distinguishing  features,  all  of  which  are  vital  to 
explaining  the  crisis  of  2007-9.  First,  relations  between  large  non-financial 
corporations and banks have been altered, as the former have come to rely heavily on 
internal finance, while seeking external finance in open markets. Large corporations 
have acquired independent financial skills - they have become financialised.  
Second, banks have consequently transformed themselves. Specifically, banks 
have  turned  toward  mediating  transactions  in  open  markets,  thus  earning  fees, 
commissions and trading profits. They have also turned toward individuals in terms of 
lending  and  handling  financial  assets.  The  transformation  of  banks  has  relied  on   25 
technological  development,  which  has  encouraged  ‘hard’  as  opposed  to  ‘soft’ 
practices of risk management.  
Third,  individual  workers  and  households  have  been  led  into  the  financial 
system  with regard to both borrowing and holding financial assets. The retreat of 
public provision in housing, health, education, pensions, and so on, has facilitated the 
financialisation of individual income, as have stagnant real wages. The result has been 
the  extraction  of  financial  profits  through  direct  transfers  of  personal  revenue,  a 
process called financial expropriation. 
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Fig 1. Mortgage Lending, USA, % of GDP 
  
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association, various issues 
 
Fig. 2 Bank Assets as % of GDP 
 
Source: Flow of funds accounts (Fed, BoJ, Bundesbank), ONS.   27 
Fig. 3  Commercial Bank Equity as % of Assets 
 
Source: Flow of funds accounts (Fed, BoJ, Bundesbank), ONS. 
 
Fig 4  Leverage of Non-bank Corporations 
 
Source: Flow of funds accounts (Fed, BoJ, Bundesbank), ONS.   28 
Fig. 5 Aggregate investment as % of GDP 
 
Source: Flow of funds accounts (Fed, BoJ, Bundesbank), ONS. 
 
Fig. 6  Public debt as % of GDP 
 
Source: Flow of funds accounts (Fed, BoJ, Bundesbank), ONS.   29 
Fig 7  Household debt as % of GDP 
 
Source: Flow of funds accounts (Fed, BoJ, Bundesbank), ONS. 
 
Fig 8  Consumption as % of GDP  
 
Source: Flow of funds accounts (Fed, BoJ, Bundesbank), ONS.   30 
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